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I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS Article argues that by rejecting New York's "separate entity
rule," federal district courts have unwittingly created problems
that, ironically enough, validate the rule. The separate entity rule
is a long-standing New York doctrine under which each branch of a bank
is treated as a separate entity (that is, as if each branch were a distinct
bank) for purposes of garnishment and attachment of assets.' Thus, to
take an example, under the separate entity rule, a judgment creditor in
* B.A. 1996, University of Chicago; M.A. 2005, Columbia University; J.D. 2008,
NYU School of Law. Mr. Sant is currently Special Counsel at the New York office of
Dorsey & Whitney LLP and Director of the Chinese Business Lawyers Association.
1. See, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 288 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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New York could not attach or garnish assets held in a bank branch in
Paris even if that bank also had a branch in New York.2 Traditional justi-
fications for the separate entity rule include: (1) comity, including respect
for other legal systems; (2) the danger of creating contradictory court
judgments regarding the same asset; and (3) the impracticality and enor-
mous costs associated with forcing banks to routinely perform global as-
set searches.3 These three justifications-comity, avoiding contradictory
judgments, and costs-have been the central justifications for the sepa-
rate entity rule's existence throughout the past century.4
New York state and federal courts are "deeply divided" over "whether
the separate entity rule remains good law."5 In the last three years, a
number of federal district courts in New York have concluded that the
separate entity rule is a dead doctrine.6 On the other hand, every New
York state court to consider the issue has declared that the separate en-
tity rule remains good law.7 This "deep divide" between the federal and
state courts in New York has resulted in a "lack of clarity" and "varied
and inconsistent views" among the courts.8 A number of courts have
themselves discussed this "deep divide," and two court decisions have
specifically called for the Second Circuit or the New York Court of Ap-
peals to resolve the split.9 Writing that she was "acutely aware of the lack
of clarity permeating this area of the law," Judge Loretta A. Preska took
the unusual step of certifying her decision for immediate interlocutory
appeal to the Second Circuit in an attempt to resolve the split between
the federal and state courts.'0
The importance of this issue-whether or not New York continues to
recognize the separate entity rule-can hardly be overstated. New York
is, of course, an "international financial center,"'1 and the separate entity
rule is "of far-reaching importance to the commercial and banking
worlds." 12 Entities such as the Institute of International Bankers, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Clearing House Association
2. Philipp v. Chase Nat'1 Bank, 34 N.Y.S.2d 465, 466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942) (dealing
with this precise scenario).
3. See discussion infra, Section II.A-C.
4. Id.
5. Lanier Saperstein & Geoffrey Sant, The Separate Entity Rule: The Deep Divide,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 2012, at 4 (quoting Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 150151/
2011, 2012 WL 89823, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2012)); see also Shaheen Sports, Inc. v.
Asia Ins. Co., Nos. 98-CV-5951 LAP, 11-CV-920 LAP, 2012 WL 919664, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 14, 2012) (discussing the different positions of federal and state courts).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. Shaheen, 2012 WL 919664, at *9; Global Tech., Inc., 2012 WL 89823, at *1.
9. See Shaheen, 2012 WL 919664, at *9; Global Tech., Inc., 2012 WL 89823, at *13;
Transcript of Proceedings at *13, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Li, No. 1:10-CV-04974-RIS (S.D.N.Y.
June 17, 2011) (No. 73) (Judge Sullivan stated that the higher courts will need "to say once
and for all what it is to do in cases like this one").
10. Shaheen, 2012 WL 919664, at *9; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (allowing such an
appeal). The notice of appeal to the Second Circuit was filed on April 12, 2012.
11. Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2009).
12. Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 743, 249 N.Y.S. 319, 320 (N.Y. City Ct.
1931).
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have each submitted amicus briefs urging courts to recognize that the sep-
arate entity rule remains good law.13
This Article argues that the very split between federal and state courts
regarding the viability of the separate entity rule itself demonstrates of
the value of the separate entity rule.14 The problems that federal and
state courts have created by disagreeing about the validity of the separate
entity rule exactly mirrors the problems created when New York courts
order the attachment of assets abroad.15 In other words, the rejection of
the separate entity rule paradoxically validates it.
Specifically, the "deep divide" between the state and federal decisions
regarding the separate entity rule has resulted in: (1) problems relating to
the issue of comity, due to certain federal district courts' disagreement
with and "reject[ion]" of the decisions by New York state courts; (2) con-
tradictory judgments regarding the validity of the separate entity rule;
and (3) impracticality and enormous expense, as the same issue is repeat-
edly litigated to differing results. The division between the state and fed-
eral courts has resulted in the exact problems that justified the separate
entity rule. To take the analysis a step further, just as the branches of a
bank in different jurisdictions are "separate entities" under the separate
entity rule (notwithstanding the fact that they are parts of the same
bank), so too the federal and state courts are "separate entities" with
respect to the separate entity rule (notwithstanding that both are purport-
edly applying the same New York law).
Ironically, then, those district courts that have rejected the separate en-
tity rule demonstrate its value by creating within the New York court
system the very problems of comity, contradictory judgments, and legal
expense that the separate entity rule was designed to prevent.
II. THE SEPARATE ENTITY RULE: BACKGROUND
AND JUSTIFICATIONS
"Under the separate entity rule, a bank branch in New York is re-
garded as if it were a separate corporate entity from a bank branch
[outside of New York]-as if the two bank branches were different banks
altogether-for the purposes of attachment and garnishment."16 For this
reason, "service of a restraining notice upon the New York branch does
not restrain any accounts held by the bank branch [outside of New
York]."' 7
Courts have repeatedly claimed that the separate entity "doctrine finds
13. See, e.g., Samsun Logix Corp. v. Bank of China, No. 105262/10, 2011 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2268 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011); Dwight Healy & Marika Maris, New York Court Deter-
mines That Banks Still Have the Protection of the "Separate Entity" Doctrine After Koehler,
128 BANKING L.J. 668, 670 (2011).
14. See infra Sections V-VIII.
15. Id.
16. Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 150151/2011, 2012 WL 89823, at *4




its inception in English law"18 or "can be traced back to English law."19
However, the earliest case to express the rule appears to be an 1842 deci-
sion by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, declaring that "there can be no
doubt but that a branch bank is the owner and holder of [assets deposited
with it]. It has a distinct corporate existence . . . [from other branches]." 20
As will be demonstrated below, the historical justifications for the sep-
arate entity rule went through three phases. In the first phase, beginning
with the origination of the rule in the 1800s and continuing through the
first decades of the 1900s, courts focused on the dangers of having varying
claims to the same asset and on the impracticability of requiring bank
branches to monitor the status of accounts in other branches.21 In the
second phase, beginning in the 1930s, courts increasingly began to con-
sider comity as a justification for upholding the separate entity rule. 2 2 In
these decisions, comity, inconvenience, and-to a lesser extent-compet-
ing claims to the same asset all appeared as justifications for the separate
entity rule.2 3 In the third and final phase prior to the court of appeals
decision in Koehler, the justification for the separate entity rule focused
primarily on comity and inconvenience, while the concern regarding com-
peting claims to the same asset began to fade.24
A. THE FIRST PHASE: JUSTIFYING THE SEPARATE ENTITY RULE
BASED ON THE DANGERS OF INCONVENIENCE AND
COMPETING CLAIMS TO THE SAME ASSET
During the 1800s, courts in the United States and England encountered
a series of disputes resulting from attempts to present a check at one
bank branch to withdraw funds located at a separate branch. In some
instances, the bank paid out the funds only to discover later that the ac-
count in the separate branch had insufficient funds to cover the cost of
the check. To avoid this problem, branches frequently refused to pay out
funds held at separate branches. In the 1857 case of Woodland v. Fear,
the court held that "the obligation of a bank to pay the cheques of a
customer rested primarily on the branch at which he kept his account,
and that the bank ... had rightfully refused to cash the cheque at another
branch." 25 Two decades later, the British courts reaffirmed this principle,
stating: "It would be difficult for a bank to carry on its business by means
of branches on any other footing, because the officials at one branch do
18. United States v. First Nat'1 City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1963), rev'd, 379
U.S. 378 (1965).
19. Global Tech., Inc., 2012 WL 89823, at *12.
20. M'Neil v. Wyatt, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 125, 127 (1842).
21. See infra Section I.A; see also First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d at 19-21 (recounting
this history).
22. See infra Section I.B.
23. See infra Section I.B.; see also First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d at 19-21.
24. See infra Section I.C.
25. E.B. Savory & Co. v. Lloyds Bank, Ltd., [1932] 2 K.B. 122 (C.A.) 141 aff'd, [1933]
A.C. 201 (P.C.) (U.K.) (summarizing the decision in Woodland v. Fear, (1857) 119 Eng.
Rep. 1339 (K.B.); 7 E. & B. 519 (Eng.)).
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not know the state of a man's account at another branch."26 In these
decisions, the courts concluded that bank branches were justified in act-
ing as separate entities due to: (1) the danger of conflicting claims to the
same funds; and (2) the impracticality and expense of monitoring ac-
counts in multiple branches. 27
In the United States, the Civil War presented courts with their first
opportunity to deal with some of the realities and impracticalities of
cross-border banking. In McVeigh v. The Bank of the Old Dominion, the
bank president was behind Confederate lines and could not receive no-
tice regarding certain payments that occurred at the bank, which was lo-
cated in Union territory.28 Taking advantage of this confusion, an
individual in Union territory fraudulently intercepted payment of bank
funds intended for someone else. 29 Although this case did not directly
focus on the separate entity rule, the court emphasized both the difficul-
ties of conflicting claims and the challenge of monitoring accounts in
cross-border banking situations, and concluded that "it is perfectly cer-
tain that the Bank of the Old Dominion in the city of Alexandria in the
state of Virginia, is the place at which these notes, on their face, are
payable."30
By 1906, the separate entity doctrine had already been summarized in
language similar to that used today by a leading treatise on banking:
"Where a bill passes through several branches of the same bank, each
branch is a separate bank for giving notice."31 Half a decade later, a Brit-
ish court felt it could declare the separate entity rule "well settled."32
The separate entity rule began to appear in New York court decisions
by the early 1900s. Among the earliest of these is Chrzanowska v. Corn
Exchange Bank.33 Noting that the then-operative Banking Law required
that the business of a bank be conducted at the place specified in its cer-
tificate of incorporation, the First Department of the New York Appel-
late Division concluded, "It would seem, therefore, quite clear that,
without express authority elsewhere conferred by statute, a bank would
have no right to establish branches." 34 The "express authority" necessary
to establish branches, the First Department declared, existed in a sepa-
rate section of the Banking Law, which permitted a bank to maintain
26. Prince v. Oriental Bank Corp., (1877-1878) 3 App. Cas. 325 (P.C.) 332 (appeal
taken from Wales) (U.K.); see also E.B. Savory & Co., [1932] 2 K.B. at 141 (quoting this
language from Prince).
27. Prince, (1877-1878) 3 App. Cas. At 332-33; E.B. Savory & Co., [1932] 2 K.B. at
141.
28. 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 785 (1875).
29. Id. at 789.
30. Id. at 830.
31. HENRY DUNNING MAcLEOD, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF BANKING 575 (6th
ed. 1906) (citing Clode v. Bailey, (1843) 152 E.R. 1107 (C. Exchq.); 12 M. & W. 51 (Eng.);
Woodland (1857) 7 E. & B. at 519).
32. R v. Lovitt, [1912] A.C. 212, 219.
33. Chrzanowska v. Corn Exch. Bank, 159 N.Y.S. 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916), affd, 122
N.E. 877 (N.Y. 1919).
34. Id. at 388.
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''one or more branch offices in such city for the receipt and payment of
deposits and for making loans and discounts to the customers of such
branch offices only." 35 Focusing on the word "only," the court concluded
that these statutes combined to legislatively limit bank branches to han-
dling the accounts actually maintained in those branches. 36 Therefore,
depositors could only "draw their checks on the particular branch in
which they were depositors."37
Having concluded that bank branches were legislatively required to act
as separate entities, the First Department then reviewed the public policy
reasons for a separate entity rule. "[D]ifferent branches [are] as separate
and distinct from one another as from any other bank."3 8 To force one
branch to turn over assets that were actually located in another branch
"would produce endless confusion." 39 Thus, the earliest New York deci-
sion to support the separate entity rule justified itself based on impracti-
cality ("endless confusion"). The phrase "endless confusion" implies that
the court was also concerned with the danger of competing claims to the
same funds.
Less than a decade later, the Second Circuit discussed the separate en-
tity rule, and it too concluded that it was legislatively required. 40 Quoting
the Act of December 23, 1913, the Second Circuit wrote that "national
banks having foreign branches 'shall conduct the accounts of each foreign
branch independently of the accounts . . . of its home office, and shall at
the end of each fiscal period transfer to the general ledger the profit or
loss accrued at each branch as a separate item.'"41 This language, the
court concluded, required that foreign branches be treated as if they were
separate entities. 42 Summing up the doctrine, the court declared that "[a]
branch is not a mere 'teller's window[']; it is a separate business entity." 43
The wisdom of requiring branches to be treated as separate entities was
seemingly demonstrated seven years later in the United Kingdom when
certain individuals managed to cash intercepted checks at a branch other
than the location where the account was maintained.44 During trial, evi-
dence revealed that banks with both a London head office and local
branch offices had for many years simply accepted, without question,
checks presented at any branch, regardless of whether an account was
maintained there or not.4 5 British banks had apparently followed this
35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).




40. Pan-Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat'l City Bank, 6 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1925), cert.
denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925).
41. Id. at 767.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. E.B. Savory & Co. v. Lloyds Bank, Ltd., [1932] 2 K.B. 122 (C.A.), affd, [1933]
A.C. 201 (P.C.) (U.K.).
45. Id. at 123-24.
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practice for over forty years. 46 Nevertheless, the House of Lords de-
clared this practice to be unduly risky and susceptible to just the sort of
incident being litigated, in which intercepted checks had been improperly
cashed. 47 Once again reaffirming the separate entity rule, the House of
Lords stated:
[N]o doubt the respondent bank with its head office and all its
branch offices is a single corporation, and consequently can for its
own purposes treat the accounts of a customer at different branches
as one entire account, at the same time it is clear from the authorities
that for certain purposes branch offices, although agencies of one
principal firm, are regarded as distinct trading bodies. 48
Here, the court essentially stated that the failure to follow the separate
entity rule led directly to contradictory claims to the same funds (i.e., the
contradictory claims of the legitimate recipient of the checks and the pos-
sessor of the intercepted checks). 49
B. THE SECOND PHASE: COMITY APPEARS AS A NEW JUsTIFICATION
The second phase of justifications for the separate entity rule began in
the late 1920s, at which time a rapid increase in international banking
focused the courts' attention on the issue of international comity.50 Up
until this point, courts were primarily concerned with the issues of incon-
venience and, more pointedly, the fear of multiple conflicting claims to
the same asset.51
In 1927, the English Probate Court first applied the separate entity rule
to accounts maintained in branches in foreign countries.52 The Second
Circuit has since described this holding as "[a]n important case" and es-
sentially adopted its reasoning.53 In United States v. First National City
Bank, a wife seeking a garnishment order against her husband's bank ac-
counts attempted to extend that order to branch offices located in Kenya
and Tanganyika. 54 The court concluded, first, that "the contractual obli-
gation between bank and customer contains certain implied terms,"
namely, that "the bank is to repay [the funds] at the branch where the
account is kept .. . and .. . the bank is not required to pay until payment
is demanded at [that] branch."55 Second, the court stated that "the debt
of the bank at its main office did not extend to deposits in its branch
banks, [therefore] it was not property within the jurisdiction of the En-
glish court and was not subject to attachment there."5 6 The court based
46. Id. at 122.
47. Id. at 125-26.
48. Id. at 140.
49. Id.
50. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
51. See discussion supra II.A.
52. Richardson v. Richardson, (1927) 137 L.T.R. 492 (Prob.) (Eng.).
53. United States v. First Nat'1 City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1963).
54. Id. (summarizing Richardson).
55. Id. at 19.
56. Id. at 20.
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its rationale in this decision on jurisdiction, which in turn implies a con-
cern with international comity.
A few years after this decision, a New York court considered a similar
scenario. The plaintiff attempted to obtain an order requiring a bank to
turn over information regarding funds held in a branch in Puerto Rico,
and the court rejected the request by stating that '[a] branch bank is a
separate and distinct business entity."57 Elaborating, the court held that
"[t]he defendant could not commence an action against the bank in New
York for the deposit made by him in the Porto [sic] Rico branch." 5  By
the late 1930s, as banking became increasingly global, the issues of im-
practicality and international comity moved to the forefront. Thus, a
New York court quashed an attempt to attach assets held in the Havana
branches of a pair of international banks, with the court making special
reference to the global nature of the banks and the concomitant issues of
competing legal regimes and impracticality: "The Royal Bank of Canada
is chartered under the laws of ... Canada . . .. [I]t has over 650 branches
in various countries." 59 It noted further that "Chase National Bank is
organized under the laws of the United States, and its Havana branch is
operated as a distinct business entity . . . . The Havana branch is con-
ducted as a distinctly Cuban bank, under Cuban laws and Cuban li-
censes." 60 The increasing number of cases attempting to attach or
otherwise access funds held in accounts in foreign countries reflected the
ongoing globalization of international banking and finance.
In Philipp v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, the court made
a principled distinction between funds located in branches in New York
and Paris.61 While funds deposited in the New York branch of a bank
were attachable, funds in the Paris branch of Chase Bank were not.6 2
"Even if it were indebted ... ,the indebtedness would be that of the Paris
Branch and therefore not attachable here."63
Although the justifications for the doctrine were shifting, by 1950 New
York courts were declaring the separate entity rule "well established." 6 4
In Cronan v. Shilling, the court stated: "The law seems well established
that a warrant of attachment served upon a branch bank does not reach
assets held for, or accounts maintained by, the defendant in other
branches or in the home office."65 The court explained that "[t]he the-
ory .... is that for purposes of attachment, among others, each branch of a
57. Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 249 N.Y.S. 319, 321 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931);
see also id. ("Not only are branch banks separate entities . . .
58. Id. at 322.
59. Clinton Trust Co. v. Compania Azucarera Cent. Mabay S.A., 14 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939), affd, 15 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939).
60. Id. at 745.
61. Philipp v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 34 N.Y.S.2d 465, 466 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1942).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Cronan v. Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950), affd, 126 N.Y.S.2d
192 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953).
65. Id.
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bank is a separate entity, in no way concerned with accounts maintained
by depositors in other bra[n]ches or at the home office." 6 6 The first justi-
fication the court gave was the danger of competing claims to the same
asset:
Unless each branch of a bank is treated as a separate entity for at-
tachment purposes, no branch could safely pay a check drawn by its
depositor without checking with all other branches and the main of-
fice to make sure that no warrant of attachment had been served
upon any of them.67
The second justification the court gave was the impracticality and ex-
pense of forcing banks to comply with such a demand, stating, "Each time
a warrant of attachment is served upon one branch, every other branch
and the main office would have to be notified. This would place an intol-
erable burden upon banking and commerce, particularly where the
branches are numerous, as is often the case." 68 Although this decision
does not mention comity, the overall trend continued to move towards
comity and inconvenience as the new justifications for the separate entity
rule. The concern with competing claims to the same asset continued to
fade.69
C. THE THIRD PHASE: COMITY AND INCONVENIENCE
MOVE TO THE FOREFRONT
In a 1963 case, the Second Circuit discussed in detail "the policy justifi-
cations underlying the [separate entity] rule."70 As discussed above, the
earliest decisions relating to the rule focused on the issue of impracticality
and upon what was, at that time, the very real problem of bank branches
dealing with competing claims to the same asset. By 1963, however,
courts had been applying the separate entity rule for over half a century,
and memory of the problem of competing claims for the same asset ap-
pears to have faded.71 The Second Circuit continued to reference the
impracticality of forcing branches across the world to monitor the status
of claims to assets elsewhere: "[T]he policy justifications [for the separate
entity] rule rest . . . on the more fundamental notion that to require any
branch to respond to the demand of a depositor in another branch any-
where in the world would impose an intolerable burden on the banking
community."72 In this regard, the Second Circuit emphasized "the im-




69. See infra Section II.C.
70. United States v. First Nat'1 City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds. 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
71. In any case, the decision in United States v. First Nat'1 City Bank did not discuss in
depth the issue of competing judgments during its analysis of the policy justifications for
the separate entity rule. See id. at 21-22.
72. Id. at 22.
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accounts in one branch to all other branches."73 Nevertheless, it is the
relatively new concern about international comity (and the concern of
subjecting banks to contradictory legal systems) that moved to the fore-
front as the primary justification for the doctrine. The court explained
that, with the globalization of finance, "complications . . . arise out of the
fact that different branches may be subject to the laws of other
countries." 74
The concern that international banks had to deal with contradictory
and independent judicial systems was later reflected in a brief of the
United States as amicus curiae, which emphasized that an international
bank operating in a foreign country "is necessarily subject to the foreign
sovereign's own laws and regulations,"7 5 A 1990 state court decision ref-
erenced comity76 but focused on inconvenience,77 although the discussion
of inconvenience did hint at the problem of competing claims to the same
asset.7 8 Similarly, a 1996 decision focused on the issue of comity and re-
spect for foreign jurisdictions in upholding the separate entity rule; the
issue of competing claims was apparently forgotten. 79
The degree to which the concern regarding contradictory claims to the
same judgment had faded as a justification for the separate entity rule is
best exemplified by the fact that a recent law journal article on the sepa-
rate entity doctrine neglects to mention it at all.80 Rather, the article sim-
ply states that the "separate entity rule was historically justified on the
basis of both . . . impracticability . . . and on the recognition that any
banking operation in a foreign country 'is necessarily subject to the for-
eign sovereign's own laws and regulations."81 Likewise, a 2003 district
court decision stated that "the original rationale of [the rule was] avoid-
ing undue disruption of routine banking practices" and that this rationale
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Ci-
tibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 496 U.S. 660 (1990) (No. 88-1260), 1989 WL
1126987.
76. Intercontinental Credit Corp. v. Roth, 578 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990),
vacated, 595 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) ("[E]nforcement of the instant judg-
ment ... must be obtained through the [foreign nation's] courts, by means of comity. . .
77. Id. at 956-57.
78. Id. at 956. ("[N]o bank branch could safely pay a check drawn by a depositor
without checking with all other branches to ascertain whether an attachment had been
served on any of them.").
79. Fid. Partners, Inc. v. Phil. Exp. & Foreign Loan Guar. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1113,
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[The plaintiff] seeks to reach funds ... on the opposite end of the
globe and in another sovereign nation.").
80. See Healy & Maris, supra note 13, at 669; but see David Gray Carlson, Critique of
Money Judgment (Part Two: Liens on New York Personal Property), 83 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
43, 96 n.327 (2009) ("For branches existing abroad, where full faith and credit does not
reign, New York's 'separate entity' rule is indeed useful. If ten different countries each
insisted on the effectiveness of local garnishment with regard to a deposit elsewhere, a
bank with foreign branches would have a tenfold liability for a single deposit.").
81. Healy & Maris, supra note 13, at 669 (quoting Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 496 U.S.
660, (1990) (No. 88-1260), 1989 WL 1126987).
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"may still carry weight when the requested transfers involve banks sub-
ject to foreign laws and practices." 8 2 As is evident from these quotations,
courts have forgotten the problem of competing claims to the same asset.
The trend towards comity and inconvenience as the justifications of the
separate entity rule has continued to the present. In the most recent New
York decision to discuss the separate entity rule, the three international
bank defendants-Banco Santander, Itau Unibanco, and UBS-justified
the separate entity rule primarily based upon considerations of comity,
and secondarily upon considerations of inconvenience and expense.83
These banks "invoke[d] policy considerations, including the interest in
avoiding conflict and interference with foreign law, to support imposition
of the rule .. . 84 There is no mention, however, of the issue of conflicting
claims to the same asset.85
With the separate entity rule increasingly entrenched in New York,
courts felt less need to review the justifications for the doctrine. When a
New York state trial court rejected the Sheriff of the City of New York's
attempt to attach funds held in bank accounts in Germany, both the First
Department and the Court of Appeals simply affirmed the lower court's
ruling without discussion.86 In 1996, a federal district court not only
stated that New York's separate entity rule was "well-established," but
went on to state that it was "[a] rather extraordinary proposition that a
sheriff or marshal serving an execution . . . in New York can levy upon
deposits in a bank account in another jurisdiction."8 7 A 2002 district
court decision swiftly brushed aside an attempt to attach assets held in a
bank account abroad, also calling the separate entity rule "well-estab-
lished" and commenting that the rationale for this doctrine is the "intol-
erable burden" that "would otherwise be placed upon banking and
commerce. "88
As banking operations became computerized, some plaintiffs began to
argue that the separate entity rule should be considered "obsolete in the
context of modern centralized and computerized commercial banking."89
This attack focused only on the justifications of expense and inconve-
nience. 90 In a similar case a year prior, notwithstanding that the attack
only centered on one of the three justifications, a federal court held that
the separate entity rule was no longer valid-at least among different do-
mestic branches of the same bank-due to technological advances and
82. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 288 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
83. Ayyash v. Koleilat, No. 151471/2012, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. McCloskey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 183 N.E.2d 227 (N.Y. 1962).
87. Fid. Partners, Inc., 921 F. Supp. at 1119.
88. Lok Prakashan Ltd. v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 5852(LAP), 2002
WL 1585820, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2002) (quoting Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab
v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1965)).





improvements in banks' communications and record keeping. 91 In the
succeeding years, there was much confusion as to whether or not the sep-
arate entity rule remained valid, with courts "determin[ing] the validity of
the service of restraining notices and subpoenas on a case by case basis in
relation to a bank's existing computer operations and the burden im-
posed by compliance." 92
Fighting back against the tendency to assume that computerized banks
can easily perform international asset searches, international banks have
emphasized the ongoing inconvenience, expense, and difficulties of per-
forming international attachment of assets:
A global banking corporation . . . would have great difficulty ensur-
ing that all of its far-flung affiliates received notice . . . , searched
their respective records for assets (shares, deeds, safe deposit boxes)
they might hold in any number of capacities, and secured them. This
would not be, even in the computer age, a click-of-a-button
exercise. 93
Eventually, the First Department clarified that the separate entity rule
remains valid and continues to prevent all attempts to attach or garnish
assets held at a separate branch of the same bank. 94 The only exception
is "where the . . . notice is served on the bank's main office; the main
office and the branches where the accounts in question are maintained
are within the same jurisdiction; and the bank branches are connected to
the main office by high-speed computers and are under its centralized
control." 95 As the First Department's ruling made clear, the separate en-
tity rule continued to shield assets in bank branches located outside of
New York from attachment and garnishment. 96 The result is that "the
separate entity rule [came to] resemble[ ] a rule of jurisdiction governing
attachments of property. The separate entity rule thereby lost its connec-
tion to its origin in concerns about the relationship of bank offices."97
From its origins in the mid-1800s as a means of protecting provincial
branches from overdrafts and fraud, the separate entity rule has evolved
into a key backbone of the modern system of global banking and interna-
tional finance. 98 Over the course of this evolution, the three central justi-
fications for the separate entity rule have been: (1) issues of comity
(including respect for foreign courts and laws); (2) competing claims or
91. Digitrex, Inc. v. Johnson, 491 F. Supp. 66, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
92. Limonium Mar., S.A. v. Mizushima Marinera, 961 F. Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (internal quotations omitted) (collecting cases).
93. Brief of Clearing House Association L.L.C. as Amicus Curae in Support of Re-
spondents at 20-21, Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 577 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 05-
2378-CV), 2009 WL 1615261.
94. In re Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., 703 N.Y.S. 2d 3 (N.Y. app. Div.
2000) (emphasis omitted).
95. Id. at 3.
96. Id.
97. Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 150151/2011, 2012 WL 89823, at *4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2012).
98. See Prince v. Oriental Bank Corp., (1877-1878) 3 App. Cas. 325 (P.C.) 333 (appeal
taken from Wales) (U.K.).
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judgments regarding the same asset; and (3) the impracticality of requir-
ing branches to monitor and turn over funds, documents, and assets held
in foreign branches.99 The relative importance of these individual justifi-
cations has fluctuated over the centuries, but the three justifications for
the doctrine have otherwise remained remarkably consistent.
III. THE KOEHLER DECISION CASTS DOUBT ON THE
SEPARATE ENTITY RULE
After more than a century in existence, the separate entity rule was
thrown into doubt by the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Koeh-
ler v. Bank of Bermuda.100 The litigation in Koehler was notoriously
messy lasting over sixteen years and entangling federal district courts in
New York and Maryland, as well as the Second Circuit, the Fourth Cir-
cuit, and courts in Arizona, Bermuda, and Nevis, before finally reaching
New York's highest court.' 0 ' The legal battle resulted from a failed busi-
ness partnership between Lee Koehler and A. David Dodwell to build
resort properties in Bermuda and other overseas locations.102 The vari-
ous lawsuits revolved around Koehler's attempt to collect upon a default
judgment by means of the stock that Dodwell owned in a Bermuda cor-
poration, The Reefs Beach Club Limited (The Reefs).103 Complicating
matters was the fact that Dodwell had pledged these stock certificates to
the Bank of Bermuda Limited (BBL) as collateral for a loan. 104 BBL
physically maintained possession of the stock certificates in Bermuda.105
The legal saga began in 1993 when a district court in Maryland awarded
Koehler a default judgment of over $2 million against Dodwell.106 Koeh-
ler registered the judgment in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York and filed a petition to collect by means of
attaching the stock certificates.' 0 7 This triggered a ten-year legal battle,
in which BBL challenged whether or not there was personal jurisdiction
in New York over the bank.0 8 Initially, the question of jurisdiction fo-
cused on BBL's wholly owned subsidiary, the Bank of Bermuda (New
York).109 The New York district court found that BBL was "doing busi-
99. See supra sections IIA, II.B, and accompanying text.
100. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 2009).
101. See Lanier Saperstein,, Limiting Koehler, INT'L FIN. L.R., MAR. 2011, at 39, 39.
102. Id.
103. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., Nos. 931745, M18-302, 1994 WL 48825, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1994).
104. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 544 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 2008).
105. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 827.
106. Id.
107. Id. (noting the petition was filed under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225 (McKINNEY, 2009)
governing the "payment or delivery of property of judgment debtor").
108. Koehler, 544 F.3d at 81.
109. Saperstein, supra note 101, at 39. Note that some commentators have mistakenly
described the Bank of Bermuda (New York) as a "branch" of BBL. See, e.g., Michael A.
Bottar & Kimberly Wolf Price, 2009-2010 Survey of New York Law Civil Practice, 61 SYR-




ness" in New York because BBL and the Bank of Bermuda (New York)
had such a close relationship that the subsidiary was in an agency rela-
tionship with the parent.110 During the course of this legal battle, the
United States magistrate judge declared that BBL had "failed to comply
over an extended period of time both with its discovery obligations and
with specific rulings of [the district] court.""' Facing the threat of sanc-
tions, in October 2003, BBL took the unusual step of conceding personal
jurisdiction in New York (as of the commencement of the creditor peti-
tion ten years earlier).112 With BBL now conceding personal jurisdiction,
the Second Circuit certified the following question to the New York
Court of Appeals:
[May] a court sitting in New York . . ., pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5225(b), order a bank over which it has personal jurisdiction to de-
liver stock certificates owned by a judgment debtor (or cash equal to
their value) to a judgment creditor, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. Arti-
cle 52, when those certificates are located outside New York[?]" 113
The New York Court of Appeals, in a "sharply divided 4-3"114 deci-
sion, held that a court "that has personal jurisdiction over a garnishee
bank can order the bank to produce stock certificates located outside
New York."115 As the majority noted, in a "turnover order," a court can
require a third party in possession of a judgment debtor's assets to turn
over those assets to the judgment creditor in satisfaction of the debt.116
The court noted that, under the language of C.P.L.R. section 5225(b), a
court "require[s] such person to pay the money"-in other words, the
turnover order is directed at the third party and not at the assets them-
selves.1 7 Therefore, a turnover order "involves a proceeding against a
person-its purpose is to demand that a person convert property to
money for payment to a creditor."118 This implies that because the pro-
ceeding is against a person and not against the asset, the physical location
of the asset is irrelevant.119
The majority emphasized that "CPLR article 52 contains no express
territorial limitation" and that the New York legislature had amended a
separate section of Article 52, relating to information subpoenas, to "al-
110. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., Nos. 931745, M18-302, 1994 WL 48825, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1994). In particular, Koehler seized upon promotional literature that
advertised BBL's "seven strategically placed offices . . . connected to [its] Bermuda head-
quarters, and to each other, by a communications system so advanced that they can act and
react as one office." Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., No. M18-302, 2003 WL 289640, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 11, 2003).
112. Koehler, 544 F.3d at 81.
113. Id. at 88.
114. Saperstein & Sant, supra note 5.
115. Id. (quoting Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825, 831 (N.Y. 2009)).
116. N.Y. C.P.L.R 5225(b) (McKINNEY 2012); see also Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 827-28
(2003) (discussing turnover orders).
117. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 828.
118. Id. at 829.
119. See id.
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low[] the securing of out-of-state materials by in-state service of a sub-
poena on the party in control of the materials." 120 From this, the
majority concluded that CPLR Article 52 should likewise be interpreted
as having extraterritorial reach. 121
Notably, the court of appeals's conclusion directly contradicts the rea-
soning of the Supreme Court, which has stated that "[i]t is a longstanding
principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States." 122 In other words, when a statute is silent as to
whether or not it has extraterritorial reach, the Supreme Court interprets
the statute as applying only within the territory of the United States.123
By contrast, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that where the
statute is silent ("contains no express territorial limitation"), the statute is
deemed to have no jurisdictional limits. 1 2 4 The majority further noted
that judgment debtors can be ordered to bring property into New York to
satisfy the debt, and by logical extension, third parties can also be re-
quired to bring the judgment debtor's property into New York.125
Judge Robert S. Smith's fiery dissent, joined by two other members of
the court, referred to the majority decision as "troubling," possibly "un-
constitutional," "unwise," "a recipe for trouble," and "unsupported by
any precedent in New York or, apparently, in any other jurisdiction." 126
In its opening sentence, Judge Smith's dissent summarized the majority
decision as holding that "a judgment may be enforced by garnishment in
New York if the garnishee is subject to New York jurisdiction, even
though the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor and the property that
the judgment creditor is trying to seize are all elsewhere." 127 "The major-
ity's holding opens a forum-shopping opportunity for any judgment credi-
tor trying to reach an asset of any judgment debtor held by a bank (or
other garnishee) anywhere in the world." 128
Although the decision never discussed nor even directly implicated the
separate entity rule,129 Judge Smith's dissent focused on the same three
concerns that have traditionally justified the separate entity rule. Thus,
the dissent referred to the concept of comity and respect for the legal
process in foreign jurisdictions: "[C]laims against a single asset should be
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
123. Id.
124. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 829.
125. Id. at 830.
126. Id. at 831-32 (Smith, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 831.
128. Id.
129. See Shaheen Sports, Inc. v. Asia Ins. Co., Nos. 98-CV-5951 LAP, 11-CV-20 LAP,
2012 WL 91964, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2012) ("Importantly, the New York Court of
Appeals did not mention the separate entity rule as part of its analysis. . . ."); Ayyash v.
Koleilat, No. 151471/2012, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012) ("Koehler did not involve
application of the separate entity rule.").
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decided in a single forum-and . . . that forum should be ... a court of the
jurisdiction in which the asset is located."130 This, in turn, leads to the
danger that "[t]here may be competing claims to the asset, by parties who
think they have as much right to it as the judgment creditor."'13 By not
limiting litigation to the forum where the asset is held, the majority hold-
ing has created "risks [for international banks] of being subject to con-
flicting adjudications."1 3 2  Lastly, the dissent focused on the
impracticality and expense for "the business of banking itself, [because]
banks with offices in several states or countries, will also be disrupted"
and forced to absorb "significant administrative burdens."133 Thus, the
dissent highlighted the three perennial concerns that the separate entity
rule addresses. 134
The Koehler decision did not directly implicate the separate entity
rule.'35 As the federal district court previously noted, "the separate en-
tity rule [had] no role to play in this case." 136 This is because, among
other things, BBL took the unusual step of conceding personal jurisdic-
tion.137 Both the Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals
found the concession of personal jurisdiction highly significant, with both
of these higher courts making repeated reference to BBL's concession of
personal jurisdiction. 138 Thus, the Second Circuit's certified question
made specific reference to the concession of personal jurisdiction, and the
first and last sentences of the majority decision both refer specifically to
the presence of personal jurisdiction. 139 Additionally, the Bank of Ber-
muda (New York) was a wholly owned subsidiary of BBL. Thus, if the
court had not concluded it was a mere agent of BBL, it would have ex-
isted as a separate corporate entity from BBL (even without the benefit
of the separate entity rule).140 Under these highly unusual facts, there
was no need or logical reason to apply or discuss the separate entity rule.
Nevertheless, as discussed below, a number of courts and commenta-
tors concluded that the Koehler decision implicitly abrogated the separate
entity rule.141 Because the dissent listed the same three concerns that
130. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 831 (Smith, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 832.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Shaheen Sports, Inc. v. Asia Ins. Co., Nos. 98-CV-5951 LAP, 11-CV-920 LAP,
2012 WL 91964, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2012); see also Ayyash v. Koleilat, No. 151471/
2012, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012).
136. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., No. M18-302 (CSH), 2005 WL 551115, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2005).
137. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 544 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 2008).
138. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 827-31; Koehler, 544 F.3d at 81, 86.
139. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 827, 831; Koehler, 544 F.3d at 88.
140. See Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 150151/2011, 2012 WL 89823, at
*10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2012).
141. For commentators, see, for example, Daniel L. Brown & Elizabeth M. Rotenberg-
Schwartz, Judgment Secured: Now What?, N.Y. L.J., July 20, 2009. For courts, see infra
notes 145-152, 169-174, and accompanying text. On the other hand, the Second Circuit
continued to apply the separate entity rule in the pre-judgment attachment context even
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traditionally justified the separate entity rule, and because the dissent re-
ferred to a leading Second Circuit decision on the separate entity rule as
"[t]he case that is perhaps most relevant to the question,"'14 2 some courts
extended the logic of the decision to conclude that the separate entity
rule was now dead as a doctrine.143
IV. RESPONSES TO KOEHLER: A SPLIT
AMONG THE COURTS
State and federal courts have split dramatically in their interpretation
of the Koehler decision, with the state courts uniformly affirming the con-
tinued validity of the rule while federal courts have reached various con-
clusions, the most common being that the doctrine is dead.144
One of the first cases to confront the separate entity rule after Koehler
was 1W Oilfield Equipment v. Commerzbank.145 JW Oilfield's unusual
factual background included a particularly sympathetic plaintiff. A Ger-
man entity sued the American company JW Oilfield in the United States
and lost at trial.146 The defendant, the U.S. company JW Oilfield, won
fees.' 47 When it tried to collect, the German entity refused to pay and
instead sheltered its assets in Germany. 148 JW Oilfield then attempted to
use the New York branch of the German bank, Commerzbank, to garnish
assets held in a German branch of the bank.149 The federal district court
expressed little sympathy toward a judgment debtor that "flouted lawful
orders" and "affirmatively avail[ed] [itself] of [the United States'] courts
and then attempt[ed] to avoid the consequences."o50 Moreover, Com-
merzbank took the unusual position of seemingly conceding that Koehler
had put an end to the separate entity rule.15' Faced with a sympathetic
plaintiff, a judgment debtor that had brought suit in the U.S. and then
disappeared, and an international bank that did not contest the death of
the separate entity rule, the court rejected any application of the doctrine
by predicting that "Koehler indicates that New York courts will not apply
the separate entity rule in post-judgment execution proceedings."1 5 2
after Koehler. See Allied Mar., Inc. v. Descatrade SA, 620 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2010);
David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Mari-
time Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J.
425, 470 (2012) (discussing Allied Maritime).
142. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 832 (Smith, J., dissenting).
143. See infra notes 145-152, 169-174, and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., JW Oilfield Equip., LLC v. Commerzbank AG, 764 F. Supp. 2d 587
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Samsun Logix Corp. v. Bank of China, No. 105262/10, 2011 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2268 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 12, 2011).
145. 764 F. Supp. 2d.
146. Id. at 590.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 590-91.
150. Id. at 597-98.




Shortly after the JW Oilfield decision, the issue of the separate entity
rule was raised in dicta in a decision in the Eastern District of New
York.153 In McCarthy v. Wachovia, the plaintiff sued a bank for improp-
erly restraining his bank account.154 The court concluded that the bank
was contractually authorized to restrain the bank account, and then ad-
ded in dicta that, "because Wachovia has branches within New York-
and therefore conducts business in New York-it is subject to the juris-
diction of the New York courts."' 55 This brief sentence, although not di-
rectly discussing the separate entity rule, appears to reject the concept of
separate branches as separate entities. In McCarthy, just as in JW
Oilfield, no party specifically defended the separate entity rule as an
ongoing and valid doctrine, and thus the court's decision was not based
upon an adversarial proceeding regarding the separate entity rule's ongo-
ing validity.156
Next to examine the separate entity rule were two New York state
court decisions, and both reached very different conclusions regarding
the separate entity rule.157 In May 2011, a New York trial court consid-
ered and rejected an attempt by a Korean plaintiff to enforce a London
arbitration award through a special proceeding in New York against Chi-
nese banks.'58 In this case, Samsun Logix v. Bank of China, Justice Jane
S. Solomon expressed concern that, without the separate entity rule, New
York would transform into a "global clearinghouse for judgment credi-
tors,"15 9 a concern originally raised in Judge Smith's dissent in Koehler,160
and seemingly validated by the panoply of nations represented in Samsun
(notably, a dispute without any particular connection to New York).'61
Justice Solomon reasoned that the court of appeals would have been ex-
plicit had it intended to eliminate the separate entity rule, commenting,
"the Court of Appeals in Koehler did not even mention the separate en-
tity rule, thereby strongly indicating that it had not intended to overrule
that doctrine."162 In particular, the court found the risk of competing
claims to be a particularly compelling justification for the separate entity
rule, noting that the banks could be subject to double liability if the New
York court required the turning over of the assets while a foreign court
ordered the assets to remain with the purported judgment debtor.163
One month later, another New York state court also concluded that the
153. McCarthy v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 759 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
154. Id. at 269.
155. Id. at 273, 275.
156. Id. at 275.
157. See Samsun Logix Corp. v. Bank of China, No. 105262/10, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
2268 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 12, 2011); Parbulk II AS v. Heritage Mar. SA, 935 N.Y.S.2d 829
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).
158. Samsun, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2268, at *1-20.
159. Id. at *11.
160. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825, 831 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
161. Samsun, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2268, at *1.
162. Id. at *8.
163. Id. at *15-19.
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separate entity rule remains good law.1 6 4 In Parbulk II AS v. Heritage
Maritime SA, the court dealt with the issue of international judgment
creditors using New York courts to pursue claims against foreign enti-
ties. 165 A Norwegian plaintiff attempted to collect upon a London arbi-
tration award against a Singaporean firm that was the subsidiary of an
Indonesian shipping group. 1 6 6 Justice 0. Peter Sherwood wrote, "[t]his
court disagrees" with the earlier IW Oilfield decision, commenting that
"[t]he question certified to the New York Court of Appeals ... did not
involve the separate entity rule and the New York Court of Appeals did
not address it."167 With perhaps a surreptitious jab at the federal courts,
Justice Sherwood emphasized that the separate entity rule remains valid
"[u]ntil the appellate courts in New York hold otherwise." 1 6 8
Just when it might have seemed that the tide had turned in favor of
upholding the separate entity rule, in October 2011, another federal dis-
trict court declared that the separate entity rule was dead.169 This case,
Eitzen Bulk v. Bank of India, would appear on the surface to be-like
Parbulk-a concrete example of Justice Smith's concerns come to life.
The company, Eitzen Bulk, was, at the time of the judgment, owned by a
Chilean entity (it had been owned by a European shipping entity at the
time litigation commenced), and it was pursuing assets held by an Indian
company in an Indian branch of an Indian bank based on an English arbi-
tration award.170 Despite this lack of connection to New York, the court
in Eitzen Bulk found that "[t]he result in Koehler supports the conclusion
that Bank of India's subpoena responses must account for information
and materials available from branches outside New York."171 According
to Judge Hellerstein's decision, the separate entity rule has no application
in the "postjudgment enforcement context."172 More pointedly, Judge
Hellerstein rejected the analysis in Samsun Logix, writing: "The court in
Samsun Logix did discuss Koehler, but I do not agree with that court's
analysis. In any event, . . . Samsun Logix [does not] represent[ ] authority
binding upon me."' 73 Half a year later, the Second Circuit vacated the
Eitzen Bulk decision, but without mentioning the separate entity rule,
leaving it unclear whether or not the Second Circuit disagreed with the
aspect of the decision dealing with the separate entity rule.17 4
In January of 2012, yet another state court reaffirmed the separate en-
164. Parbulk II AS v. Heritage Mar. SA, 935 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831-32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).
165. Id. at 830.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 832 n.1.
168. Id.
169. Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Bank of India, 827 F. Supp. 2d 234, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
170. See id. at 236; Dismantling?, MARINE MONEY INT'L http://www.marinemoney.com/
archive/dismantling (June 17, 2010) (login and subscription required) (describing sale of
Eitzen Bulk to Chilean entity).
171. Eitzen Bulk, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
172. Id. at 240.
173. Id.
174. Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Bank of India, No. 10-3352-cv (2d Cir. May 12, 2011) (order
granting appellee's motion to dismiss and vacating district court's order).
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tity rule.175 In Global Technology, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, the
plaintiff attempted to obtain assets held by a Mexican company in the
Toronto branch of a Canadian bank.176 Referring to Koehler, the court
commented that "Justice Smith's concerns about forum shopping . . . ap-
pear to have been borne out here."' 77 The plaintiff served the bank with
a restraining notice and then a turnover order, requiring the bank to turn
over "all money/property being held by Royal Bank of Canada that be-
longs to Judgment Debtor Moto Diesel Mexicana."17 s During the time
the restraining order was in place, but prior to the issuance of the turno-
ver order, the Toronto branch of the bank allowed the judgment debtor
to withdraw some funds.179 The plaintiff brought an action against the
bank, and the bank responded by citing the separate entity rule, arguing
"that the restraining notice served upon respondent's branch in Manhat-
tan was not effective to restrain [the] Toronto bank account, because
[the] bank account at issue was allegedly opened in Canada, maintained
in Canada only, and could not be accessed in the United States."' 80 In a
detailed discussion, Justice Stallman not only affirmed the ongoing valid-
ity of the rule, but also provided an extended theoretical argument in
favor of its existence. 8 1
Justice Stallman analogized the separate entity rule to rules governing
service of process:182 "Just as CPLR 311 provides that service upon a cor-
poration is properly made upon certain officers of a corporation . . . the
separate entity rule requires that service of a post-judgment restraining
notice upon a bank must be made upon the bank branch where the ac-
count is maintained." 183 Justice Stallman explained that "[v]iewed as a
rule for service . . ., service of a restraining notice upon one bank branch
(other than the main branch) would be improper, if the restraining notice
sought to restrain an account that the served bank branch did not main-
tain."184 Finally, Justice Stallman, like other state courts, concluded that
"[w]ithout a clear statement from the Appellate Divisions or the Court of
Appeals," he would not consider the separate entity rule to be abro-
gated.185 Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Justice Stallman's deci-
sion is that he spent ten pages discussing whether or not the separate
entity rule remains valid, including a deep historical discussion of the
rule, even though the fact that the plaintiff already recovered the entire
amount owed by the judgment debtor, seemingly rendering the lawsuit
175. See Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 150151/2011, 2012 WL 89823
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2012).
176. Id. at *1.
177. Id. at *10 n.7.
178. Id. at *1.
179. Id. at *2.
180. Id.
181. Id. at *3-13.
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moot.186
With Justice Stallman's decision, the split between the federal and state
courts became highly pronounced, as three state courts affirmed the sepa-
rate entity rule as still valid and three federal courts declared the doctrine
dead.'87 Stallman's decision makes note of the split, describing the fed-
eral courts as "deeply divided from New York trial-level courts on this
issue"188 and commenting that New York state courts "rejected" 89 the
federal court opinions declaring the separate entity rule to be extinct.
The very next month, yet another federal district court declared that
the separate entity rule was dead. 190 Arnaprop Limited v. Indiabulls Fi-
nancial Services Limited appeared to implicate the same "clearinghouse
for global creditors" concerns that had led many state courts to insist that
the rule remained valid. 191 Here, a Cayman Island company sought to
use New York courts to enforce an arbitration award against an Indian
company by means of garnishing assets held in India.192 Nevertheless,
despite this seemingly clear-cut case of "a forum-shopping opportunity
for [a] judgment creditor trying to reach an asset of [a] judgment
debtor . . . anywhere in the world,"1 93 the court found that the separate
entity rule did not apply. 194 Citing to IW Oilfield and Eitzen Bulk, the
court found personal jurisdiction over the foreign bank. 195 Emphasizing
the split between the state and federal courts, Judge Gardephe wrote that
"a court in this district has expressly rejected the analysis in Samsun
Logix."196 Judge Gardephe agreed with the analysis in Eitzen Bulk and
IW Oilfield that the separate entity rule was dead. 197 Moreover, the
court not only found that the defendant bank was required to restrain
assets, but it also declared that, if the bank failed to restrain assets, "it
[would] be held in contempt and coercive fines [would] be assessed."1 98
One month later, another federal district court considered the issue,
but this time found the separate entity rule alive and well.199 In Shaheen
Sports, Inc. v. Asia Insurance Co., Judge Preska dismissed a turnover peti-
tion served on the New York branches of two international banks.200 The
judgment creditor, relying on Koehler, demanded that the banks turn
186. Id. at *2-13.
187. Id. at *14.
188. Id. at *1.
189. Id. at *14.
190. Transcript of Proceedings, Amaprop Ltd. v. Indiabulls Fin. Servs. Ltd., No. 11-CV-
2001-PGG-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2012) (No. 79),
191. Id. at 4-9.
192. Id. at 2-3.
193. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E. 2d 825 831 (2009) (Smith, J., dissenting).
194. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 190, at 4-9.
195. Id. at 9.
196. Id. at 8.
197. Id. at 9.
198. Id. at 22.
199. See Shaheen Sports, Inc. v. Asia Ins. Co., Nos. 98-CV-5951 LAP, 11-CV-920 LAP,
2012 WL 919664, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2012).
200. Id. at *9.
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over assets held in branches outside of the United States.201 Judge
Preska, however, concluded that the separate entity rule remained valid
and that the turnover petition could not force New York branches of in-
ternational banks to move assets from outside the United States into New
York.202 Judge Preska noted that the separate entity rule had even been
"codified in the Article of the New York Commercial Code governing
funds transfers and creditor processes." 203 Judge Preska's decision em-
phasized that the court of appeal's decision in Koehler never mentioned
the separate entity rule, and that the court would not extinguish the cen-
turies-old doctrine by implication through silence. 204 She added: "In light
of the significant policy principles underlying the separate entity rule and
its lengthy history in New York courts, however, it is not unreasonable to
expect that if the New York Court of Appeals had chosen to eliminate it,
it would have said so [explicitly]." 2 0 5
More significantly, perhaps, Judge Preska noted the severe split be-
tween the federal and state courts regarding the separate entity rule, writ-
ing that "both of the New York state courts" have upheld the separate
entity rule, and commenting that these cases "are instructive in that they
are the only New York state post-judgment execution cases to analyze the
viability of the separate entity rule post-Koehler, and both courts found
the rule had survived." 206 She further stated that "[t]he Court is particu-
larly mindful that New York state courts have uniformly rejected Peti-
tioner's reading of Koehler while explicitly disagreeing with the only
federal holding in this district to embrace it."207 Judge Preska then took
the unusual step of certifying her decision for immediate appeal to the
Second Circuit, emphasizing the "lack of clarity permeating this area of
the law," "the relative frequency" of these cases, and "the relatively high
risk of varied and inconsistent views on this subject going forward." 208
With Judge Preska's decision that the separate entity rule remains good
law, the courts became perfectly split, four-to-four, half declaring the doc-
trine dead, and half proclaiming it alive and well.
On October 25, 2012, yet another New York state court found the sepa-
rate entity rule to be good law.2 0 9 In Ayyash v. Koleilat, the court dis-
played an even greater degree of dismissiveness toward those federal
courts that have declared the doctrine to be dead by simply ignoring
them. Writing as if there were no cases to the contrary, the Ayyash court
states simply that "courts have rejected arguments that Koehler impliedly
201. Id. at *1-2.
202. Id. at *7, *9.
203. Id. at *3 (citing N.Y. U.C.C. LAw §§ 4-A-105(1)(b), 4-A-502(4) (McKINNEY 2012)
("A branch or separate office of a bank is a separate bank for purposes of this Article.")).
204. Id. at *4-5.
205. Id. at *5.
206. Id. at *6 (referring to the decisions in Samsun Logix and Parbulk). Judge Preska
was apparently unaware of Justice Stallman's decision in Global Technology. Id.
207. Id. at *7.
208. Id. at *9.
209. Ayyash v. Koleilat, No. 151471/2012, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012).
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abrogated the separate entity rule in post-judgment enforcement
proceedings. "210
The Ayyash court was most persuaded by the issues of comity and in-
convenience. The court wrote that the "plaintiff's demands implicate the
laws of various foreign jurisdictions, including but not limited to, France,
Switzerland, Monaco, Spain, [and] Brazil." The court also noted that the
banks implicated in the litigation have branches in many foreign coun-
tries, including Banco Santander, which "has branches in 40 countries,"
Credit Suisse, which "operates in 54 countries," Itau Unibanco, which
"operates in 19 countries," and UBS AG, which is "present in more than
50 countries." 211 The court then explained that, "[u]nder principles of
international comity, a New York court should not encroach upon an-
other nation's sovereignty by requiring citizens to take actions within
their home country that would contravene their home country's laws."212
The court noted that ordering the production of banking information
from accounts held in foreign countries would violate those countries'
bank secrecy laws.213
The Ayyash court also made reference to oft-mentioned concern that
New York would turn into a clearinghouse for global creditors. Accord-
ing to the court, "plaintiff is attempting to use the New York courts as a
springboard for a massive, multi-jurisdictional international exercise in
supplemental proceedings, instead of simply complying with the laws of
the countries in which the judgment debtor's assets are actually lo-
cated." 214 This language highlights inconvenience ("a massive multi-
jurisdictional international exercise"). Thus, the court made reference to
both comity and, to a lesser extent, inconvenience.
At this point, the split remains nearly equal, with five courts declaring
the separate entity rule alive, and four declaring it dead. Especially no-
ticeable is the split between the state and federal courts, with all four
state courts affirming the validity of the separate entity rule, while all but
one federal court has held it abrogated.
V. COMITY
The United States Supreme Court has described the concept of comity
as "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."215
210. Id. Ayyash cited to Global Tech, Samsun Logix, and Parbulk (the three state
court decisions upholding the separate entity rule) and to Shaheen Sports (the federal dis-
trict court decision upholding the rule), while ignoring the three district courts to announce
the rule dead, excepting one passing reference to Eitzen Bulk.
211. Id. at *13.
212. Id. at *14.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *12.
215. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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The Third Circuit summarized comity as the concept that "any exercise of
jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce sanctions based on the effects of for-
eign activity in a domestic court requires the court to balance the inter-
ests it seeks to protect against the interests of any other sovereign that
might exercise authority over the same conduct."216 The separate entity
rule implicates the concept of comity due to the reality that an interna-
tional bank "may be subject to the laws of other countries." 2 17 In other
words, U.S. courts seek to respect the rights of foreign sovereigns and
foreign courts to administer justice and to say what the law is in those
territories. 218
In American jurisprudence, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story is
often credited with introducing the concept of comity.2 19 Justice Story
emphasized the link between the concept of international comity and the
concept of comity between the federal government and the states:
To no part of the world is [the concept of comity] of more interest and
importance than to the United States, since the union of a national gov-
ernment with already that of twenty-six distinct states, and in some re-
spects independent states, necessarily creates very complicated private
relations and rights between the citizens of those states. . . .220
Federal courts have often cited comity as a reason for not interfering in
matters best left to state courts.221 It is expected that, in some instances,
federal district courts shall "abstain[ ] from hearing a particular proceed-
ing" in "the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State
law." 22 2 Thus, the same principles of comity that support recognizing the
right of foreign sovereigns to "determine the meaning of their own laws
in the first instance," also supports the view that federal courts should
look to the state courts when interpreting issues of state law.2 2 3
Here, where the separate entity rule is New York law, the principle of
comity strongly suggests that federal courts should follow the lead of the
state courts. The Second Circuit has repeatedly noted "that states deter-
mine the meaning of their own laws in the first instance." 224 "Where a
decision is to be made on the basis of state law, . . . the Supreme Court
216. Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 76 (3d Cir. 1994).
217. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 1963).
218. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (stating that it is for the court to
say what the law is).
219. See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International
Cornity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 11, 23 (2010); Harold G. Maier, Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private Interna-
tional Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 283-84 (1982).
220. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWs § 9 (Melville M.
Bigolow 8th ed. 1883) (1834).
221. See, e.g., Wallace v. Kern, 481 F.2d 621, 622 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1135 (1974) ("[U]nder the principle known as comity a federal district court has no power
to intervene in the internal procedures of the state courts").
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (2006).
223. Cf Joseph v. Athanasopoulos, 648 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Serio, 261 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 2001)).
224. See id.
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has long shown a strong preference that the controlling interpretation of
the relevant statute be given by state, rather than federal, courts." 225 The
Supreme Court has stated that it is best to "place[ ] state-law questions in
[state] courts [which are] equipped to rule authoritatively on them."2 2 6
According to the Supreme Court, federal courts approach state law issues
"as 'outsiders' lacking the common exposure to local law which comes
from sitting in the jurisdiction." 2 2 7 Not only are state courts best
equipped to deal with state law issues, but the principle of comity also
requires that federal courts display respect for state courts and their judg-
ments. "[R]espect for the place of the States in our federal system calls
for close consideration of that core question;" namely, whether the fed-
eral courts should decide a dispute.228
The principle of comity, then, leads to two results directly relevant to
the separate entity rule. First, the concept of comity calls for courts
within the United States to respect the rights of foreign sovereigns to
resolve matters relating to assets held within those nations. This is one of
the principles that form the separate entity rule. Secondly, however, the
concept of comity calls for federal courts to respect the decisions of state
courts on matters of state law. Because the New York state courts have
unanimously affirmed the continuing existence of New York's separate
entity rule, comity calls for the federal courts to respect these conclusions
and recognize the ongoing existence of the doctrine. In this way, the
principle of comity supports both the tenacity of the separate entity rule
and also the view that federal courts should defer to and recognize the
decisions of state courts, which have declared that this doctrine remains
valid.
From this comes an ironic result: The federal courts that have rejected
the separate entity rule have ended up validating the rule by creating the
very problem that the separate entity rule was meant to address. Federal
courts applying state taw must do so by gleaning how the state courts
would rule. 2 2 9 In the case of the separate entity doctrine, multiple state
courts have already ruled that the doctrine remains valid, yet most of the
federal courts considering the matter have chosen to reject 2 3 0 and "not
agree" 231 with these decisions. 232 Judge Hellerstein, for example, de-
scribed the state court decision as not "binding upon me." 2 3 3 These rejec-
tions of state court decisions would seem to contradict the principle of
comity.
225. Allstate, 261 F.3d at 150.
226. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997).
227. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
228. Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 75.
229. Allstate, 261 F.3d at 150 (describing how federal courts in applying New York law
must attempt to glean how New York courts would rule on the issue).
230. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 190, at 8.
231. Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Bank of India, 827 F. Supp. 2d 234, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
232. See supra Part IV.
233. Eitzen Bulk, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 240.
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Judge Preska has also commented upon this state of affairs: "The Court
is particularly mindful that New York state courts have uniformly re-
jected" the view that Koehler eliminated the separate entity rule "while
explicitly disagreeing with the . . . federal holding[s]."2 34
By failing to show deference to state court views on matters of state
law, the federal courts that have rejected the separate entity rule have
instead displayed the problems inherent in ignoring the principle of com-
ity. This, in turn, has unwittingly demonstrated the importance of the
separate entity rule itself.
VI. CONFLICTING JUDGMENTS
As described above, the earliest court decisions establishing the sepa-
rate entity rule focused in particular upon the danger of conflicting claims
to the same asset or conflicting judgments regarding that asset.2 3 5 Courts
could avoid producing such conflicting judgments regarding the same as-
set by treating each branch of a bank as a separate entity. As separate
entities, only the branch with actual possession of the asset could be re-
quired to turn it over. As early as the turn of the twentieth century, the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department stated
that any contrary doctrine would "produce endless confusion." 236
As these court decisions show, a seemingly well-founded fear of contra-
dictory results partially motivated the creation of the separate entity rule.
With the separate entity rule's existence currently in jeopardy, there has
been a renewed risk of inconsistent judgments and competing claims to
the same asset. In Shaheen Sports, Inc. v. Asia Ins. Co., Judge Preska
wrote that the bank "submitted evidence that such a transfer of assets
would violate Pakistani law and [the bank] is currently defending Asia
Insurance's pending suit for injunctive relief in Pakistan's courts." 237 She
concluded that the bank's "concern for potential inconsistent judgments
and double liability is therefore very real."2 3 8 In upholding the continued
validity of the separate entity rule, Judge Preska not only cited the cur-
rent dangers of inconsistent judgments, but also harkened back to the
rule's earliest historical justifications: "It will come as no surprise that the
separate entity rule from its inception was designed to target the concerns
of banks susceptible to such multiple claims, first across branches, and
more recently across borders."239
234. Shaheen Sports, Inc. v. Asia Ins. Co., Nos. 98-CV-5951 LAP, 11-CV-920 LAP,
2012 WL 919664, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2012).
235. See Chrzanowska v. Corn Exch. Bank, 159 N.Y.S. 385, 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916),
affd, 122 N.E. 877 (N.Y. 1919); Woodland v. Fear, (1857) 119. Eng. Rep 7; E. & B. 519,
1339 (K.B.) (Eng.); Prince v. Oriental Bank Corp., (1877-1878) 3 App. Cas. (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Wales) (U.K.); E.B. Savory & Co. v. Lloyds Bank, Ltd., (1932) 2 K.B. 122
(C.A.) (Eng.), aff'd, [1933] A.C. 201 (P.C.) (U.K.).
236. Chrzanowska, 159 N.Y.S. at 388.
237. Shaheen Sports, Inc., 2012 WL 919664, at *7.
238. Id. at *8.
239. Id.
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An ironic result of the rejection of the separate entity rule (by some
but not all of the federal district courts) is that this very rejection has
validated the rule's importance. The rejection demonstrates the dangers
inherent in contradictory judgments. By choosing to reject the separate
entity rule, certain federal courts have contradicted the interpretations of
state law given by the state courts.
In some cases, the contradiction was unintentional. For example, JW
Oilfield v. Commerzbank and McCarthy v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., the
courts commented upon the implications of the Koehler decision without
the benefit of any state court guidance. 240 In other cases, the federal dis-
trict courts were aware that New York state court decisions had reaf-
firmed the separate entity rule, and nevertheless chose to reject these
state court decisions.241 Thus, in some cases, the federal courts incor-
rectly predicted how the state courts would rule, and in other cases the
federal courts simply rejected the rulings already issued. Both of these
situations-incorrect predictions, on the one hand, and rejecting the state
court decisions, on the other hand-demonstrate in different ways one of
the very risks that the separate entity rule so handily addresses.
In JW Oilfield, the court assumed that New York state courts would
conclude the separate entity rule was dead 242-an assumption that turned
out to be incorrect.243 This demonstrates the dangers of U.S. courts at-
tempting to anticipate how other tribunals and foreign entities will ad-
judge rights to assets, as well as the risk that U.S. courts will misjudge
how those foreign entities will interpret and enforce their own laws re-
garding such issues as banking secrecy, privacy, and effective service. If
the New York district courts are capable of misinterpreting how the New
York state courts will view the validity of the separate entity doctrine, it is
even more likely that U.S. courts will misinterpret foreign laws and regu-
lations with which those courts have far less experience.
Similarly, the decision by a number of federal district courts to "reject"
the state court rulings regarding the separate entity rule demonstrates
that, if U.S. courts begin adjudicating the rights to assets and documents
held in bank branches abroad, foreign courts may likewise choose to "re-
ject" these decisions, resulting in conflicting judgments and double liabili-
ties. When one considers that the federal courts reached different results
from the New York state courts, despite the fact that the federal courts
are expected to follow the rulings of the state courts, it seems even more
likely that foreign courts, which are under no obligation to follow Ameri-
can case law, will decide not follow U.S. courts.
240. JW Oilfield Equip., LLC v. Commerzbank AG, 764 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595-96
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); McCarthy v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 759 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274-75
(E.D.N.Y. 2011).
241. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings supra note 190, at 8-9; Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Bank
of India, 827 F Supp. 2d 234, 240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
242. JW Oilfield, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 595-96.
243. See Samsun Logix Corp. v. Bank of China, No. 105262/10, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
2268, at *7-8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 12, 2011).
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In the case of the separate entity rule, the danger of contradictory judg-
ments is highlighted by the "deep divide" between the federal and state
courts regarding the ongoing validity of the rule. As early as 1816, the
Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Joseph Story, emphasized "the
importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions," and the
"evils" that would result from "discordant judgments." 2 4 4 "Judges of
equal learning and integrity" may naturally reach different conclusions,
so "[i]f there were no revising authority to control these jarring and dis-
cordant judgments and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws . . . of
the United States would be different in different [locations]. . . . The
public mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly
deplorable. "245
Judge Katzmann of the Second Circuit emphasized that inconsistencies
between the state and federal courts regarding state law results in a litany
of mischief:
Not only does this approach [allowing inconsistencies between state
and federal courts] treat identically situated parties differently with
no apparent rational basis, it invites forum shopping[.] Indeed, . . .
federal law may mean one thing in federal courts, and something else
entirely in state courts, a result the Supreme Court found intolerable
nearly two hundred years ago. . . .246
The dangers outlined above-"discordant judgments," "deplorable" in-
consistencies, and "forum shopping"-have each already come into exis-
tence as a result of the disagreements over the validity of the separate
entity rule.2 4 7 Law firms have even issued "Client Alerts" stating that,
due to differing judgments in state and federal court as to the validity of
the separate entity rule, clients should carefully consider whether to bring
cases in federal or state court.2 4 8
As demonstrated above, then, the federal district courts that have "re-
jected" the separate entity rule have created a "deep divide" 249 between
state and federal courts, resulting in contradictory judgments, inconsis-
tent results, and forum shopping. For their part, state courts have also
specifically "rejected" 2 5 0 the federal decisions, creating the same
problems and demonstrating the same dangers. As discussed above, the
separate entity doctrine exists in part to avoid these harms. The separate
244. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347-48 (1816).
245. Id. at 348.
246. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 407 (2d Cir. 2008)
(Katzmann, J., dissenting).
247. Martin, 14 U.S. at 347-48.
248. See, e.g., Client Alert, James E. Hough & Geoofrey R. Sant, Morrison & Forester
LLP, Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda: Two Years Later: The Impact on Attachment in New
York (Aug. 1, 2011), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110801-Koeh-
ler-v-Bank-of-Bermuda.pdf ("Under these circumstances, parties should carefully consider
whether to pursue cases in state or federal court.").
249. Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 150151/2011, 2012 WL 89823, at *1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2012).
250. Id. at *14.
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entity doctrine was intended to avoid contradictory judgments in the
United States and abroad regarding the same assets. The federal courts
rejecting the separate entity doctrine have created the litany of harms
that the separate entity rule was designed to address. Therefore, the re-
jection of the separate entity doctrine by certain federal courts unwit-
tingly validate the separate entity rule by demonstrating the dangers of
contradictory judgments that would result if the rule did not exist.
VII. IMPRACTICALITY AND EXPENSE
In his Koehler dissent, Judge Smith warned in part of the enormous
expense and the impracticalities that would result from allowing judg-
ment creditors around the world, many with no connection to New York,
to use New York courts as their "global clearinghouse" for disputes un-
connected to New York.251 Judge Smith's dissent focused on the ex-
penses and impracticalities facing international banks. 252 Likewise, as
noted above, one of the motivations behind the establishment of the sep-
arate entity doctrine was the concern with overburdening international
banks with bureaucratic requirements, including the constant transmis-
sion of information (and requests for information) regarding bank ac-
counts around the world. Requiring individual branches to track assets
and demands for assets in other parts of the world was another motivat-
ing factor. International banks forced to act as global debt collectors for
judgment creditors would be overwhelmed by the burden of tracking and
attaching assets around the globe on behalf of parties unconnected to the
bank or its business.
This concern with expense, administrative inconvenience, and bureau-
cratic burden mirrors the very problems created as a result of the rejec-
tion of the separate entity rule by certain federal courts. Much as Judge
Smith had warned in Koehler, in recent years litigants from around the
globe have used the Koehler decision as justification for demanding that
New York courts enforce foreign judgments that have no apparent con-
nection to New York. Thus, for example, a Korean plaintiff attempted to
use New York courts to force Chinese banks to enforce a London arbitra-
tion award.253 Similarly, a Norwegian plaintiff attempted to use New
York courts to enforce a London arbitration award against the Singapore
subsidiary of an Indonesian shipping group.254 Another petitioner at-
tempted to use New York courts to force a Canadian bank to turn over
the assets of a Mexican company.255 Another case involved a Lebanese
petitioner pursuing the assets of a Brazilian resident based upon a Leba-
251. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825, 831 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
252. Id.
253. Samsun Logix Corp. v. Bank of China, No. 10526/10, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2268,
at *2-3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 12, 2011).
254. Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Bank of India, 827 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
255. Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 150151/2011, 2012 WL 89823, at *1-2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2012).
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nese court judgment. 256 The number of turnover proceedings has surged,
so much so that Judge Preska commented upon "the relative frequency of
these CPLR Article 52 turnover proceedings in both the federal and state
courts of New York." 257
The recent surge in turnover proceedings filed against international
banks mirrors a similar surge in attachment cases that took place in the
mid-2000s. In 2002, the Second Circuit decided the notorious Winter
Storm case, in which the court held that electronic fund transfers (EFTs)
passing momentarily through New York were attachable property.258
When funds are electronically transferred from one bank to another, it is
typical for the banks to use a third bank as an intermediary.259 The result
was that, even where the two banks on either end of the transaction had
no presence in New York, the EFTs would electronically pass through
intermediary banks that had a New York presence. The decision by the
Second Circuit that EFTs were attachable property led to "a tsunami of
Rule B maritime attachment cases," in which international creditors with
no particular connection to New York used New York courts to attach
funds simply by virtue of a momentary electronic transfer through a bank
with a New York presence.260 Thus, cases piled up in New York courts on
the basis of fund transfers that lasted a mere fraction of a second and that
had no other connection to New York.261 Within a few years, Rule B
maritime attachment cases accounted for one-third of all lawsuits in the
Southern District of New York.26 2
As the Second Circuit later unanimously recognized, the results of
Winter Storm were disastrous, placing "strains on federal courts and inter-
national banks." 263 Not only were the courts and the banks overwhelmed
by the sheer number of attachment cases, the threat of attachment cases
caused "damage [to] New York's standing as an international financial
center" and even affected "the usefulness of the dollar in international
transactions," as international banks sought means of avoiding making
EFTs through New York banks. 264 The results were so damaging that the
Second Circuit took the highly unusual step of unanimously agreeing
"with the consent of all of the judges of the Court in active service, that
Winter Storm was erroneously decided" just seven years after the original
256. Ayyash v. Koleilat, No. 151471/2012, at *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012).
257. Shaheen Sports, Inc. v. Asia Ins. Co., Nos. 98-CV-5951 LAP, IL CV-920 LAP,
2012 WL 919664, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2012).
258. Winter Storm Shipping Ltd. v. TPI, 310 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2002). This decision was
notorious because the entire Second Circuit ruled, a mere seven years later, that Winter
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decision.265
Notably, in overturning Winter Storm, the Second Circuit expressed
from its first sentence frustration that foreign litigants and disputes un-
connected to New York were clogging the courts:
This case is based on a dispute between a company incorporated in
India and a company incorporated in Singapore over an accident
that occurred in India while one company was shipping products to
China; the dispute was to be arbitrated in England. Because the par-
ties' banks had accounts in New York banks, [an EFT] . . . was suffi-
cient [under Winter Storm] to vest jurisdiction in the United States
District Court of the Southern District of New York. 2 6 6
As discussed above, a similar situation-far-flung litigants using New
York banks to enforce foreign judgments and seize funds not even held in
New York-has appeared in response to the uncertain status of the sepa-
rate entity rule. Justice Smith's dissent in Koehler had warned of this
very scenario: "The majority's holding opens a forum-shopping opportu-
nity for any . . . judgment debtor held by a bank (or other garnishee)
anywhere in the world." 267 Judge Preska has already made note in
Shaheen of "the relative frequency of these CPLR Article 52 turnover
proceedings in both the federal and state courts of New York." 2 6 8 To
date, only the separate entity rule prevents a similar storm of foreign liti-
gation flowing through the New York courts.
Moreover, the fact that some federal district courts have announced
the death of the separate entity rule has resulted in unnecessary expense.
Specifically, because federal and state courts disagree on whether the sep-
arate entity rule remains valid, every court case implicating the separate
entity rule results in the litigation of the separate entity doctrine. Thus, to
date, at least seven different cases have litigated the validity of the sepa-
rate entity rule, with each side producing motions, affidavits, and often
expert reports.269
Thus, the third problem created by some district courts' rejection of the
separate entity rule is the creation of unnecessary expense. There has
been a surge of international turnover proceedings brought to enforce
judgments that have no particular connection to New York. These cases
would not exist if the separate entity rule were uniformly enforced.
Moreover, precisely because some district courts have rejected the state
court rulings, there has been confusion and differing judgments in the
court system, with each new set of cases litigating the validity of the sepa-
rate entity rule. These courts' rejection of the separate entity rule vali-
dates the usefulness of the separate entity rule by demonstrating the
265. Id. at 61.
266. Id. at 60-61.
267. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825, 831 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
268. Shaheen Sports, Inc. v. Asia Ins. Co., Nos. 98-CV-5951 LAP, 11-CV-920 LAP,




expense and inconvenience that results if the separate entity rule does not
exist.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE REJECTION OF THE SEPARATE
ENTITY RULE PARADOXIALLY VALIDATES
THE SEPARATE ENTITY RULE
As demonstrated above, the decisions by certain federal district courts
to declare the separate entity rule dead have unwittingly and paradoxi-
cally demonstrated the value of the doctrine. First, the decision by cer-
tain federal courts to reject the analysis of the state courts demonstrates
the risks of ignoring the principle of comity. Second, the federal court
decisions rejecting the separate entity rule have demonstrated the danger
of creating conflicting judgments. Third, the federal court decisions have
created unnecessary expense by both encouraging foreign litigants to
bring their attachment claims to New York, and also by expanding the
costs of this litigation by forcing each set of litigants to reargue whether
the separate entity rule remains valid. In this way, the rejection of the
separate entity rule by certain federal courts has ended up creating the
three concerns that have traditionally justified the separate entity rule:
comity, conflicting judgments, and expense. The rejection of the rule ac-
tually validates the necessity for the rule itself.
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